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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is a products liability case, Restatement of Torts 2d § 
402A, arising out of a construction accident in which the treads 
of a huge road profiler machine ran over the foot of plaintiff 
Michael Surace.  Surace brought suit against CMI Corporation 
("CMI"), the manufacturer of the machine, in the district court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1  The district court, 
concluding that the evidence contained in the summary judgment 
record failed to demonstrate that the profiler's risks outweighed 
its utility, and also that the profiler presented an obvious risk 
which could have been avoided had Surace exercised reasonable 
care, granted summary judgment in favor of CMI.  Surace appealed. 
 Resolution of the appeal requires us to explore the contours 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Azzarello v. 
Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), which 
established that, for purposes of strict liability, whether a 
product's condition justifies placing the risk of loss on the 
supplier is a threshold question of law for the court to 
                     
     
1
 Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. 
  
 
 3 
determine.2  That Court has also made clear that the threshold 
question turns on a social policy determination to be made by the 
trial judge.  In post-Azzarello defect cases, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court has determined that this requirement may be 
fulfilled by performing a risk-utility analysis, and that the 
multi-factor list developed by Dean John Wade may be employed in 
doing so. See John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability 
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).  Though with some 
diffidence, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
adopt that approach. 
 The appeal then requires that we apply the risk-utility 
factors to our plenary review of the district court's judgment.  
When we do so, we find that the risk-utility balance weighs in 
favor of the plaintiff.  In particular, we conclude that the 
district court erred: (1) in determining that the gravity of the 
risk of harm and the ability to eliminate it through use of a 
lockout/tagout device, identified by Surace's expert as the 
design solution to the defect, were factors weighing in favor of 
CMI; (2) in relying on Surace's own conduct to determine that the 
profiler was not unreasonably dangerous; and (3) in weighing the 
issue of causation as a factor in resolving that question.  We 
also conclude that putative alternative grounds for upholding the 
summary judgment for CMI do not pass muster.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further 
                     
     
2
  The parties agree that Pennsylvania substantive law 
governs this diversity action. Nowak By and Through Nowak v. 
Faberge, U.S.A., Inc., 32 F.3d 755, 757 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 However, we will affirm the district court's judgment 
insofar as it excluded Surace's expert witness Harold Brink from 
testifying under Fed. R. Evid. 702.  We agree that Brink lacks 
the expertise required to testify regarding the central issue of 
design defect in the case -- habituation.  Accordingly, the 
district court properly excluded Brink's testimony. 
 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On the night of September 16, 1992, Surace, an employee of 
SJA Construction Company, was working on the New Jersey side of 
the Betsy Ross Bridge.  The work crew was using a PR-450 pavement 
profiler, which had been manufactured by CMI for Caterpillar, 
Inc., to mill rumble strips at the base of the bridge.  The 
profiler had been equipped with a conveyor assembly which picked 
up and carried debris generated by the profiler to a waiting 
receptacle.  However, due to space constraints, the crew was 
operating the profiler without the conveyor assembly.   
Consequently, the crew was required to level manually the piles 
of debris left behind by the profiler. 
 On the night of the accident, Surace was working as a left-
side sensor man.  In this position, he was responsible for 
signaling the profiler's operator, William Snyder, when to start 
and stop the profiler, and in which direction to move it.  
Although the profiler was equipped with horns on the side 
specifically designed for signaling the operator, Surace was 
using hand signals to signal Snyder.  The profiler's design 
contained a "blind spot," i.e., the operator's view of the area 
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directly behind the machine was obstructed.   
 The profiler was equipped with a number of warning devices, 
including a sign prominently posted on its rear alerting the crew 
to stay at least 25 feet clear of the machine, an automatic back-
up alarm, flashing back-up lights, and a rotating overhead beacon 
light which signaled when the profiler was in operation.  These 
warning or signaling devices were all in working condition on the 
night of the accident.  Surace was wearing earplugs to protect 
his ears from the considerable noise created by the machine.  
 After the first pass of the profiler, Surace signaled Snyder 
to stop.  After moving the profiler forward, Snyder did so.  
Surace then noticed a pile of debris in the reverse pathway of 
the profiler which the machine had generated.  Surace picked up a 
broom or shovel, and, with his back to the machine, began to 
level the debris.  While Surace was behind the machine, and 
without any signal from Surace, Snyder put the profiler into 
reverse. Although the back-up alarms and signals were activated, 
Surace neither heard nor saw them, nor did he hear the shouts 
from his crew workers to move out of the way.  The profiler 
backed into Surace and snared his right foot under the treads.  
As a result of the accident, Surace sustained serious injuries, 
necessitating the amputation of part of his right foot. 
 Surace and his wife Alice (Surace) filed suit against 
Caterpillar and CMI alleging negligence and strict liability for 
defective design.3  Surace subsequently dropped the negligence 
                     
     
3
  Alice Surace claimed loss of consortium.   
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claim and, by stipulation of the parties, Caterpillar was 
dismissed from the action.  The complaint alleged that the 
profiler was defectively designed because its warning devices 
were inadequate.  Specifically, Surace alleged that the back-up 
alarms were prone to "habituation," a phenomenon by which a 
person becomes immune to a particular stimulus through constant 
repetition and exposure, and that without a “lockout/tagout” 
device, which would prevent the machine from reversing unless 
activated by the ground crew, the profiler was unreasonably 
dangerous.  
 Following a period of discovery, CMI moved in limine to 
exclude the testimony of Surace's liability experts, Joseph 
Lambert, Harold Brink and Paul Stephens, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 
702, 703, and 403.  Both Dr. Lambert, a psychologist and 
specialist in human factors analysis, and Brink, an 
electromechanical engineer, were to testify that the profiler's 
warning devices were defective because they were prone to 
habituation.  Stephens, a mechanical and safety engineer, was to 
testify that the warning devices were inadequate, and that the 
failure to equip the machine with additional safety devices 
caused the accident.  After conducting an in limine hearing, the 
district court denied the motion with respect to Lambert and 
Stephens, but granted it with respect to Brink.  Surace v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-1422, 1995 WL 303895 (E.D. Pa. 
May 16, 1995).  The court's ruling was predicated largely on the 
fact that Brink's opinion hinged on habituation, a field, the 
court found, in which Brink lacked experience and for which he 
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relied exclusively on Dr. Lambert for support.  
  CMI then moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, 
that the profiler was safe for its intended use.  As noted above, 
the district court granted summary judgment for CMI on the 
grounds that the evidence failed to demonstrate that the 
profiler's risks outweighed its utility, and that the profiler 
presented an obvious risk which could have been avoided if Surace 
had exercised reasonable care.  Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 
CIV.A.94-1422, 1995 WL 495123 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1995). 
 We exercise plenary review in determining the propriety of 
summary judgment. Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. Id.  "An issue is `genuine' only if a 
reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find 
for the non-moving party." Id. at 693-94.  
 II. THE AZZARELLO THRESHOLD ANALYSIS 
  A.  Introduction 
 Pennsylvania early on adopted the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as the law of strict products liability in Pennsylvania. 
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966).  
Section 402A of the Restatement provides in relevant part: 
 
  (1) One who sells any product in a  
 defective condition unreasonably  
 dangerous to the user or consumer . . .  
 is subject to liability for physical  
 harm thereby caused to the ultimate user  
 or consumer, or to his property, if (a)  
 the seller is engaged in the business of  
 selling such a product, and (b) it is  
 expected to and does reach the user or  
 consumer without substantial change in  
 the condition in which it is sold.   
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Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).  To establish a case under 
the strict liability doctrine, a plaintiff must prove that the 
product was defective, and that the defect proximately caused the 
plaintiff's injuries. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 
Pa. 83, 93-94, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975).  
 In Azzarello v. Black Bros Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558, 391 A.2d 
1020, 1026 (1978), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "the 
phrases `defective condition' and `unreasonably dangerous' as 
used in the Restatement formulation are terms of art invoked when 
strict liability is appropriate."  The Court also announced that 
the threshold determination as to whether the product's condition 
justifies placing the risk of loss on the manufacturer or 
supplier is a question of law for the court to resolve. Id., 391 
A.2d at 1026.  If the court determines that the product is 
defective under the facts as alleged, then the case is submitted 
to the jury to determine whether the facts indicate that when the 
product left the manufacturer’s control it “lack[ed] any element 
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possess[ed] any 
feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use.”  Id. at 
559, 391 A.2d at 1027.  The court in Azzarello, however, did not 
articulate the standard for determining whether the risk of loss 
should be placed on the manufacturer, except to note that it was 
a matter of social policy:  
 
 Should an ill-conceived design which  
 exposes the user to the risk of harm entitle  
 one injured by the product to recover?   
 Should adequate warnings of the dangerous  
 propensities of an article insulate one who  
 suffers injuries from those propensities? 
 When does the utility of a product outweigh  
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 the unavoidable danger it may pose?  These  
 are questions of law and their resolution  
 depends upon social policy. 
Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026; see also Ellen Wertheimer, 
Azzarello Agonistes:  Bucking the Strict Products Liability Tide, 
66 Temp. L. Rev. 419, 424 (1993) ("Azzarello indisputably failed 
to provide courts with guidelines for determining precisely when 
and why strict liability should attach."); David G. Owen, 
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. 
Rev. 681, 686-87 (1980) (Azzarello "did very little to help 
clarify the meaning of defectiveness and its proper standards of 
measure") (“the [Azzarello] court nowhere explicitly connects the 
test of liability chosen -- ‘unsafe for the intended use’ -- to 
even the weak policies that it does set forth”).  
 B.  Risk-Utility Analysis 
 Because we are sitting in diversity, we are, of course, 
required to the extent necessary to our decision to predict how 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the Azzarello 
standard.  In doing so, we give "`due regard' to the decisions of 
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts as `indicia of how 
the state's highest court would decide a matter.'" Nowak, 32 F.3d 
at 758 (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 
F.2d 548, 553 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
 Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court has determined that in performing the 
social policy analysis, a court must play a dual role, acting as 
both a "social philosopher" and a "risk-utility economic 
analyst." Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 424 Pa. Super. 473, 476, 623 
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A.2d 322, 324 (1993); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 346 Pa. 
Super. 95, 101 n.7, 499 A.2d 326, 330 n.7 (1985).  In doing so, 
courts, including the district court in the case sub judice, 
engage in a risk-utility analysis, weighing a product's harms 
against its social utility. Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 
Pa. Super. 496, 502, 434 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) 
("the question of whether a product is defective reaches the jury 
only after the court has weighed the relative risks and utility 
of the product"); see also Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 320 Pa. 
Super. 444, 450-51, 467 A.2d 615, 618 (1983). 
 The Superior Court's approach in this respect seems 
consistent with the tenor of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's § 
402A jurisprudence.  Indeed, in Azzarello, the Supreme Court 
indicated that a risk-utility inquiry may be appropriate in 
performing the social policy analysis. Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 558, 
391 A.2d at 1026 (suggesting that a court inquire as to whether 
“the utility of a product outweigh[s] the unavoidable danger it 
may pose").  Furthermore, Dean John Wade's article setting forth 
the risk-utility analysis was cited favorably throughout the 
Azzarello decision. Id. at 556 n.8,10, 557-58, 391 A.2d at 1025 
n.8,10, 1026.  That fact, coupled with its long hegemony in 
Pennsylvania -- risk-utility analysis has been used by state and 
federal trial courts since at least 1985 without comment by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court -- satisfies us that the Supreme Court 
would adopt it.   
 To be sure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the 
risk-utility approach to defining design defect in favor of the 
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"intended use" approach.  Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-
Norton Co., 515 Pa. 334, 340, 528 A.2d 590, 593 (1987), cited in 
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1991).4  And, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has relied on Lewis 
in rejecting actions which are based on a risk-utility theory of 
liability.5  But the courts, including this one, have not 
interpreted Lewis as supplanting application of the risk-utility 
analysis as part of the threshold social policy inquiry.  See  
                     
     
4  In Lewis, the Supreme Court acknowledged various 
approaches to determining whether a product is defectively 
designed.  The court noted that under a "consumer expectations" 
approach, adopted by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. 
Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 
P.2d 443 (1978), a product is deemed defective in design "if it 
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect 
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."  515 
Pa. at 528 A.2d at 593.  The Lewis court took cognizance of the 
risk-utility approach, under which a product design is defective 
where "on balance, the benefits of the challenged feature 
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design," id. 528 
A.2d at 593, but went on to state that the Azzarello court "sets 
forth yet another approach" to determining design defects -- the 
intended use approach. Id., 528 A.2d at 593 (citing Azzarello, 
480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027). 
     
5In Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 396 Pa. Super. 82, 
90-91, 578 A.2d 417 (1990), the plaintiff brought a strict 
liability suit against a cigarette manufacturer.  Rather than 
allege a specific defect, the plaintiff argued that the product 
was defective because the risks of cigarettes are outweighed by 
their social utility.  The Superior Court, noting that the 
Supreme Court in Lewis had declined to embrace the risk-utility 
approach to defining design defect, rejected the plaintiff's 
theory. Id. at 91, 578 A.2d at 421; accord Miller v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1988), 
aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988).  Likewise, in Dauphin Deposit 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 408 Pa. Super. 256, 265, 
596 A.2d 845 (1991), a panel of the Superior Court rejected the 
plaintiff's theory that strict liability should be imposed 
against an alcohol manufacturer solely because the risks 
associated with alcoholic consumption outweigh their utility.  
The Superior Court panel suggested that the risk-utility theory 
of liability was not a cognizable approach to defining defect 
under Pennsylvania strict liability law. Id., 596 A.2d 849.  
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Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1227 (3d Cir. 
1989); Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 399 
(W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990); Marshall v. 
Philadelphia Tramrail Co., 426 Pa. Super. 156, 165, 626 A.2d 620, 
625 (1993).6  That result is consistent with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s discussion in Lewis, which confirms, throughout, 
its “harmony” with Azzarello. 
   At all events, Lewis does not purport to cut back on 
Azzarello, and the discussion in Lewis that seems to have caused 
some confusion is background and arguably dicta; the question for 
                     
     
6In Griggs v. BIC Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1203 (M.D. Pa. 1992), 
the plaintiffs sought to have strict liability imposed, not 
because the product, a disposable butane lighter, was unsafe for 
its intended use, but because it was unreasonably dangerous to 
foreseeable users, i.e., children.  The plaintiffs advocated use 
of the risk-utility approach to design defect, rather than the 
"intended use" approach, arguing that because it was foreseeable 
that children would misuse the lighters and it was feasible to 
design child-proof lighters, on balance, the product was 
defective.  The district court, citing Hite and Dauphin, noted 
that the Pennsylvania courts have rejected the risk-utility 
approach to design defect cases. Id. at 1206-07.  The court, 
however, correctly distinguished between the use of risk-utility 
as an approach to defining defect and as a method for evaluating 
a product's 'unreasonable dangerousness' under the rubric of 
strict products liability. Id. at 1207 n.4.   
 On appeal, a panel of this Court relied on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lewis in affirming the district court on this 
issue.  Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1433 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1992).  In light of the underlying facts of the case, we read the 
panel's decision in Griggs as rejecting the argument that the 
risk-utility approach to defining defect should be used instead 
of the "intended use" approach; however, to the extent that the 
panel's decision can be read as rejecting outright the use of a 
risk-utility analysis as a part of the threshold determination, 
it is contrary to our decision in Motter, supra, which, 
subsequent to the Lewis decision, sanctioned this approach, and, 
therefore, carries no precedential weight. See O. Hommel Co. v. 
Ferro, 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[A] panel of this court 
cannot overrule a prior panel precedent. . . . To the extent that 
[the later case] is inconsistent with [the earlier case, the 
later case] must be deemed without effect." (citation omitted)).  
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decision in Lewis was whether evidence of industry standards was 
admissible in a design case.  We do not minimize the background 
discussion, and observe that it seems quite correct (as well as 
consistent with Azzarello, for it establishes no more than that 
the known hazards of products such as cigarettes or alcohol, see 
supra n. 6 or, presumably, cigarette lighters, see supra n. 7, do 
not automatically render their manufacturers or sellers liable on 
the theory that their utility is outweighed by the risks of their 
usage).  Rather, Lewis established only that, after the threshold 
Azzarello determination by the court, the jury must determine 
whether, under the facts, the product, at the time it left the 
defendant’s control, lacked any element necessary to make it safe 
for its intended use or contained any condition that made it 
unsafe for use.   See Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury 
Instructions § 8.02 (Definition of “Defect”). 
 In sum, our prediction that Pennsylvania would employ a 
risk-utility analysis in making the threshold Azzarello 
determination is not inconsistent with Lewis, and we affirm the 
district court's use of a risk-utility analysis in determining 
whether the risk of loss should be placed on CMI. 
 We regret that the Supreme Court has not yet spoken 
definitively on the matter of risk-utility analysis or its 
component factors.  Since it is almost twenty years since 
Azzarello, we hope that the Court will speak definitively soon. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a certification procedure, see 
generally Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 291, 302-
04 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., dissenting), through which we 
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could ask that court (in an appropriate case) for an early 
resolution of the question that is so critically important in 
many of the large number of diversity cases that are brought in 
the federal district courts of the Third Circuit.  We do not 
suggest that this is that case, because the outcome does not 
depend on the answer.  If the Pennsylvania Court should adopt a 
certification procedure, we must be careful to be judicious, 
indeed sparing, in our use of it even though any such procedure 
would necessarily give that court the absolute right to decline 
certification in any case.  To act otherwise would be to strain 
the delicate federal-state relationship which needs to be 
nurtured, not impaired. 
 C.  The Wade Factors 
 Absent guidance from the state Supreme Court, the Superior 
Court has also identified factors that may be considered in 
making the threshold risk-utility analysis, including the 
following list developed by Dean John Wade: 
 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product -- its 
utility to the user and to the public as a whole; (2) 
The safety aspects of the product -- the likelihood 
that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness 
of the injury; (3) The availability of a substitute 
product which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe; (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the 
unsafe character of the product without impairing its 
usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
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utility; (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the 
exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) The 
user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in 
the product and their avoidability, because of general 
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the 
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or 
instruction; and (7) The feasibility, on the part of 
the manufacturer, of spreading the loss of [sic] 
setting the price of the product or carrying liability 
insurance. 
Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 50 n.5, 485 A.2d 408, 423 
 n.5 (1984) (citing Wade, supra, 44 Miss. L.J. at 837-38); see 
also Fitzpatrick, 424 Pa. Super. at 476-77, 623 A.2d at 324 
(citing Wade factors); Phillip v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 
428 Pa. Super. 167, 180, 630 A.2d 874, 881 (1993); Riley v. 
Warren Mfg., Inc., 688 A.2d 221, 225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  The 
district court applied these factors and determined that the 
profiler was not defective and, therefore, that the risk of loss 
should not be placed on CMI.  We endorse the district court's 
methodology.  Application of the Wade factors also seems 
consistent with the tenor of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence, and we believe that the Supreme Court would find 
it acceptable and would probably follow it, though there are 
problems of construction, particularly with respect to factor 5, 
discussed infra.7   
                     
     
7
  We note that in addition to the Wade factors, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court has suggested another set of factors, 
developed by the California Supreme Court, which may be used in 
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 On appeal Surace submits that CMI should have altered the 
design of the profiler by equipping it with additional safeguards 
such as a transmission lock (a "lockout/tagout device").8  We 
turn our attention to the various Wade factors. 
  1.  Gravity of the Risk of Harm and Ability 
      to Eliminate It Through Use of the 
      Lockout/Tagout Device 
      (Wade Factors Two and Four) 
 The gravamen of Surace's argument is that the profiler was 
                                                                  
performing the risk-utility analysis: 
 
 (1) The gravity of the danger posed by  
 the challenged design; (2) the  
 likelihood that such danger would occur;  
 (3) the mechanical feasibility of a  
 safer design; (4) the financial cost of  
 a safer design; and (5) the adverse  
 consequences to the product that would  
 result from a safer design.  
 
See Dambacher, 336 Pa. Super. at 50 n.5, 485 A.2d at 423 n.5 
(citing Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 
P.2d at 455).  The Barker factors also reflect the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's approach to strict liability.  We focus on the 
Wade factors which are more widely accepted (in Pennsylvania and 
elsewhere) and are more comprehensive, including the Barker 
factors within their compass.  At all events, it is the Wade 
factors that the district court applied, albeit incorrectly, and 
hence, we limit our discussion to those factors. 
     
8
 In the district court, Surace also argued that CMI should 
have provided the operator an unobstructed view of ground 
personnel, or added a rear guard, described as a cow catcher.  At 
oral argument, Surace indicated that he was abandoning the cow 
catcher design and pursuing the lockout/tagout device as the 
"main [but not exclusive] thrust" of his argument.  However, his 
brief is devoid of argument with respect to the district court's 
disposition under Azzarello of the alternative proffered designs, 
including the need for variable alarms.  Accordingly, appellate 
review of these alternative arguments has been waived. United 
States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d Cir.) (failure to 
raise a theory as an issue on appeal constitutes a waiver), cert. 
denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 623, 136 L.Ed.2d 546 (1996).  This 
case does not present extraordinary circumstances that might 
warrant review of any unpreserved issues. Id. 
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defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the combination 
of the "blind spot" and the phenomenon of habituation, and that 
this defect could have been eliminated through the use of a 
lockout/tagout device, which would prevent the operator from 
engaging the profiler in reverse until a switch is activated by 
ground personnel.  The device would incorporate the safety 
engineering technique of lockout/tagout, a concept which, 
according to Surace's expert, although not currently in use for 
this specific purpose, has been proven and tested, particularly 
in the area of machine maintenance.  The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration has defined a lockout device as one that 
"utilizes a positive means such as a lock . . . to hold an energy 
isolating device in a safe position and prevent the energizing of 
a machine or equipment." See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(b)(1996).  In 
this case, it would prevent the operator "from inadvertently 
releasing the energy" and reversing the profiler without 
affirmative action by the ground crew.  
 Surace contends that, in rejecting this theory, the district 
court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
him. Barker v. Deere Co., 60 F.3d 158, 166 (3d Cir. 1995) (when 
performing Azzarello analysis, a court must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff) (citing Burch, 320 Pa. 
Super. at 450-51, 467 A.2d at 618-19).9  In determining that the 
                     
     
9
  We note that this conclusion is problematic.  This is 
because the risk-utility calculus (or indeed any mode of making 
the social policy determination required by Azzarello) is a legal 
determination which should probably not be predicated upon a 
weighted view of the evidence.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
might want to revisit this aspect of the matter if and when it 
definitively comes to grips with the issues we have identified in 
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profiler did not pose a grave risk of harm as currently designed 
(we view this as an application of Wade factor two), the district 
court primarily relied on its conclusion that Dr. Lambert had not 
stated in his report that Surace had in fact become habituated to 
the alarm, but had merely opined that the alarm was prone to 
habituation.  The court also based its determination on its 
conclusion that Lambert had neither tested Surace for habituation 
nor explained in his report how, when Surace was injured shortly 
after the first pass of the profiler, he could have become 
habituated to the alarm, since habituation requires constant or 
repeated exposure.  
 Lambert's report, which provided a human factors analysis of 
the accident, was based on collected accident reports, the 
results of noise measurements taken of the profiler, and human 
factors literature.  In his deposition testimony, Lambert 
admitted that, although it was feasible, he had not tested Surace 
to determine whether or not he was habituated.  He further opined 
that, "because Mr. Surace had been around this piece of equipment 
for such a long period of time, for months, that he habituated to 
this alert.  And that habituation became a long-term habituation 
that could carry from day to day."  Thus, although he did not 
note it in his report, Lambert did conclude that Surace had 
become habituated, and he further explained how Surace could be 
habituated on the profiler's first pass of the evening.  In view 
of the fact that Lambert's testimony was before the court as part 
                                                                  
this opinion. 
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of the summary judgment record, the district court was not at 
liberty to ignore it.  Moreover, because the habituation issue 
will go to the jury in its determination as to whether the 
profiler was unsafe for its intended use, the district court 
could not resolve any dispute over the issue at that stage. 
 We underscore that, in the Azzarello context, the case would 
not become one for the jury if the district court were able to 
hold as a matter of law that the risk-utility balance so favored 
the manufacturer that the profiler could not be deemed 
unreasonably dangerous. See Barker, 60 F.3d at 161.  Given the 
considerations we have just articulated, and the fact that the 
profiler will from time to time cause injury and, if so, the 
injury will be serious given the immensity and huge weight of the 
machine, we do not believe that the court could properly hold, on 
account of disputed habituation evidence, that there was not a 
sufficiently grave risk of harm from the profiler to weigh in 
favor of Surace on the risk-utility analysis (Wade factor two). 
 Applying the fourth Wade factor, the district court rejected 
Surace's contention that, because of the phenomenon of 
habituation, the profiler should have been equipped with a 
lockout/tagout device.  As proffered, the lockout/tagout device 
would prevent the operator from engaging the profiler in reverse 
until a ground worker activated a switch.  As currently designed, 
the profiler relies on horns located on the sides of the machine 
which must be activated by ground personnel, who, after visual 
inspection, signal the operator that it is clear to reverse.  It 
is undisputed that on the night of the accident, Surace was using 
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hand signals rather than these horns to signal the operator and 
that the operator put the profiler in reverse without waiting for 
a signal from Surace.  The district court concluded that there 
was no evidence that the profiler was defective without a 
lockout/tagout device.  It noted that Surace's expert, Stephens, 
was unaware of any profiler with this device, and concluded that 
he could not therefore attest to the technological or economic 
feasibility of such a device.   
 In his report, Stephens explained that the machine was 
inherently dangerous without a lockout/tagout device because of 
its "blind spot," coupled with the fact that crew members were 
required to work in close proximity to it. Stephen's Report at 3 
("severity of hazard and frequency of laborer exposure to the 
hazard dictated that [such a device] be provided on the 
machine").  Stephens further stated that the lockout/tagout 
device was both technically and economically feasible.  In 
concluding that he had not shown that the device was mechanically 
feasible, the district court emphasized that Stephens did not 
know of any currently designed construction machinery that uses 
the device.  That conclusion, however, runs afoul of our decision 
in Barker, where we held that "a district court, during its 
threshold determination, may [not] consider the nonexistence of a 
safety device as evidence of its nonfeasibility." Barker, 60 F.3d 
at 166-167; see also Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 
278, 286 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The fact that the [safety device] did 
not exist . . . does not mean that it was incapable of being 
placed on the [profiler] if it did in fact exist.").   
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 Although Stephens admitted that the device was not currently 
employed by construction machinery for this purpose, he 
repeatedly testified that such a device was used in other 
applications, that the concept had been tested and proven on 
machines comparable to the profiler, and that it could be applied 
to work for this specific purpose.  We have previously held that 
expert testimony alone may be sufficient, for purposes of summary 
judgment, to demonstrate feasibility, see Hollinger v. Wagner 
Mining Equip. Co., 667 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1981), and 
further held that, while "a clear and concise diagram or verbal 
picture of the type of device" would be helpful, it is not 
required to defeat a motion for summary judgment.10 Id. at 410.  
While it would have been preferable for Stephens to have 
proffered design drawings or developed a prototype of the device, 
his testimony was sufficient for purposes of the threshold risk-
utility calculus to make a showing of the feasibility of a 
lockout/tagout device, at least in the absence of a 
countervailing showing by CMI.  We note that, in accordance with 
                     
     
10
  In Hollinger, a panel of this Court noted that the 
district court had analyzed the question of summary judgment 
“under the traditional standard of sufficiency of the evidence to 
present a jury question,” and not as threshold matter under 
Azzarello. Hollinger, 667 F.2d at 410 n.11.  However, in the 
context in which the case was decided, the panel did not pass on 
the propriety of the district court's action. Id.  We have 
previously held that the threshold legal determination under 
Azzarello regarding the unreasonable dangerousness of the product 
is properly made in the context of summary judgment or directed 
verdict. Nowak, 32 F.3d at 758.  However, the question for the 
court to determine is whether the evidence is sufficient, for 
purposes of the threshold risk-utility analysis, to conclude as a 
matter of law that the product was not unreasonably dangerous, 
not whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of fact for the 
jury. 
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Azzarello, the technical feasibility issue will go to the jury in 
determining whether the lockout/tagout device was an element 
necessary to make the profiler safe for its intended use. 
Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 588, 391 A.2d at 1026.11 
 Finally, the district court concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence from which to determine whether the 
profiler would be safer if equipped with a lockout/tagout device. 
 Emphasizing that, as currently designed, the profiler relies on 
the crew to signal the operator that it is safe to reverse, the 
court concluded that the lockout/tagout device performs the same 
function and, because it relies on crew members to activate the 
device, "provides no assurance that human error as occurred here" 
would not cause another accident.  Surace, 1995 WL 495123, at *7. 
 However, unlike the current design, the lockout/tagout device 
would prevent the machine from going in reverse without 
affirmative action by the ground crew which, unlike the operator, 
have an unobstructed view of the reverse path of the machine.  
Stephens acknowledged that he could not state with a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty that the device could prevent the 
type of accident from occurring; however, he did attest that it 
would "cut the risk significantly."  
 In sum, while such a design could not entirely eliminate the 
possibility that after the machine was put into motion a crew 
                     
     
11
  Stephens merely stated, without explanation, that the 
lockout/tagout device was economically feasible.  However, 
although we conclude that his evidence was marginal with respect 
to this Wade factor, the totality of the factors relevant here 
would require the same result. 
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worker could walk into its pathway, it would obviously render the 
machine safer.  This conclusion is “in sync” with the 
Pennsylvania courts' approach to determining whether the risk of 
loss should be placed on the manufacturer.  The court must 
balance "the utility of the product against the seriousness and 
likelihood of the injury and the availability of precautions 
that, though not foolproof, might prevent the injury." Burch, 320 
Pa. Super. at 450, 467 A.2d at 618 (emphasis added).  Although a 
conclusion that the profiler would be made safer if equipped with 
a lockout/tagout device does not require a finding by the court, 
or even the jury, that the profiler is defective, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Surace we conclude that 
the district court could not, on this basis, decide that the 
profiler was not unreasonably dangerous.    
 Couching this discussion in terms of the Wade factors, since 
it appears that the lockout/tagout device could eliminate the 
unsafe character of the product and since it does not appear that 
the lockout/tagout device would be expensive or would otherwise 
impair the utility of the profiler, the second and fourth Wade 
factors weigh in favor of Surace.  Therefore, unless other 
factors control the balance, the case must be submitted to the 
jury.   
  2.  Consideration of Surace's Conduct and 
       the Fifth Wade Factor 
 In finding that the profiler's risks were not outweighed by 
its utility, the court concluded that the accident could likely 
have been avoided had Surace exercised due care.   Specifically, 
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the court found that because Surace was an experienced 
construction worker, fully aware of the dangers posed by the 
profiler, his conduct in wearing earplugs and turning his back to 
the machine while standing in its pathway was both careless and a 
cause of the accident.  The court observed that "[i]t would be 
unjust to burden CMI with liability in a situation where there is 
clear evidence that Mr. Surace's own lack of care played a role 
in bringing about the accident." Surace, 1995 WL 495123, at *9.  
On appeal, Surace argues that the district court erred in 
considering his conduct as part of the Azzarello threshold 
analysis.  He submits that such a consideration impermissibly 
interjects concepts of negligence into a strict liability case.   
 Pennsylvania courts generally bar consideration of 
contributory negligence in strict liability actions. See Kimco 
Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet, 536 Pa. 1, 8, 637 A.2d 603, 606 
(1993) (rejecting comparative negligence as a defense in a strict 
liability case); see also Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 
F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992).12  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
                     
     
     12
  In Dillinger, after a thorough analysis of 
Pennsylvania strict liability law, we concluded that the 
"[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court has unequivocally excluded 
negligence concepts from product liability cases" and, therefore, 
the district court had erred in ruling that evidence of the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence was admissible to rebut 
causation. 959 F.2d at 443, 444.  Our opinion in Dillinger has, 
however, not put to rest all questions relating to the manner in 
which a plaintiff's negligence may be considered in a § 402A 
case. Compare Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 840 F. Supp. 333, 335 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (relying on Dillinger for the proposition that 
evidence of a plaintiff's conduct is admissible only to show that 
the plaintiff has assumed the risk or misused the product), with 
Kern v. Nissan Indus. Equip. Co., 801 F.Supp. 1438, 1441 (M.D. 
Pa. 1992) (evidence of negligence is admissible to rebut 
causation where the plaintiff's conduct triggered events 
resulting in injury), and Kolesar v. Navistar Int'l Transp. 
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Court eschews the use of negligence concepts in a strict 
liability case. See Lewis, 515 Pa. at 341, 528 A.2d at 593 
("negligence concepts have no place in a case based on strict 
liability").  The theoretical basis for this approach is that 
strict liability focuses on the condition of the product; it is 
irrelevant that the injury was the result of the manufacturer's 
or consumer's negligence. Kimco, 536 Pa. at 7-8, 637 A.2d at 605-
06; Lewis, 515 Pa. at 341, 528 A.2d at 593.   
 An individual plaintiff's failure to exercise care in the 
use of a product is not relevant to whether the product is 
unreasonably dangerous in the first place. See Fleck v. KDI 
Sylvan Pools Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 119 (3d Cir. 1992) ("product 
liability laws . . . encourage manufacturers to make safe 
products even for the careless and unreasonable consumer");   
Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 95 n.6, 100, 337 A.2d at 899 n.6, 902 
(1975) (rejecting even the "reasonable" consumer standard for the 
"ordinary" consumer); see also William J. McNichols, The 
Relevance of the Plaintiff's Misconduct in Strict Tort Products 
Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, and the 
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 Okla. L.Rev. 201, 207 
(1994) ("unreasonably dangerous" determination requires objective 
inquiry into the "class of ordinary purchasers").  Therefore, the 
district court's consideration of Surace's conduct runs afoul of 
Pennsylvania § 402A jurisprudence.13  
                                                                  
Corp., 815 F.Supp. 818, 822 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (same), aff’d, 995 
F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993). 
     
     13
  We note further that, even assuming arguendo, that  
consideration of Surace's conduct had been appropriate under 
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 The district court believed that by endorsing the Wade 
factors, specifically, the fifth factor, (the user’s ability to 
avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product), 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court has expressly sanctioned 
consideration of a product user's conduct in failing to exercise 
care as an appropriate factor in performing the threshold 
analysis.  Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
sanctioned use of the Wade factors, we have predicted that it 
will. See supra at 14.  That prediction nonetheless admits of the 
possibility that the court will adopt some but not all of the 
Wade factors.  We note that at least one justice has commented on 
the limitations of these factors in one respect. See Sherk v. 
Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 625-26, 450 A.2d 615, 631-32 (1982) 
(Larsen, J., dissenting) (noting that use of these factors as the 
standard for determining whether a product is defective fails in 
its "attempt to maintain a distance from negligence concepts”). 
 In applying the fifth Wade factor, the district court looked 
to Surace's conduct, rather than to an ordinary product user's 
conduct.  We believe that it erred in so doing.  The Wade factors 
set forth an objective test to determine whether a product is 
                                                                  
Azzarello, the district court erred in its application of the 
facts.  The district court first suggested that Surace's use of 
earplugs was careless.  However, SJA required its crew to wear 
earplugs.  Moreover, on appeal, CMI concedes that federal 
regulations require the use of protective ear gear at the level 
at which the profiler's alarms sounded (100 db). CMI Br. at 22.  
Furthermore, although it was undisputed that Surace had turned 
his back to the machine, it was also clear that the operator 
moved the machine without being signaled, and that he had never 
done this in the past. Surace Dep. at 150; Fisher Dep. at 44.  
Therefore, a reasonable jury could infer that Surace's actions 
were not careless. 
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defective; the "user" referred to in the factors is the ordinary 
consumer who purchases or uses the product. Williams v. Briggs 
Co., 62 F.3d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Mississippi law 
and noting that the fifth Wade factor focuses on "an ordinary 
person's ability to avoid the danger by exercising care"); Riley 
v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879, 889-
90 (E.D. Pa. 1995)("we are concerned with the ability of the 
[product's users], in general, to avoid the risks inherent in the 
product, not with the particular circumstances of [a] plaintiff's 
accident" (emphasis added)); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 128 
N.J. 86, 100-01, 607 A.2d 637, 645 (1992) ("risk-utility analysis 
is an objective test that focuses on the product" and the fifth 
Wade factor requires consideration of "the extent to which the 
hypothetical `average user' of the product -- not the plaintiff -
- could avoid injury through the use of due care."); see 
generally Wade, supra, 44 Miss. L.J. at 847 ("strict liability   
. . . is imposed on an objective basis").   
 The proper focus in applying the fifth Wade factor then is 
an objective inquiry into whether the class of ordinary 
purchasers of the product could avoid injury through the exercise 
of care in use of the product, not whether this particular 
plaintiff could have avoided this particular injury.  Put 
differently, the user's ability to avoid injury by the exercise 
of care in the use of the product appears to be a design factor 
that may justify a more or less exacting design depending on the 
facts, but it is, in any case, not a vehicle for injecting a 
plaintiff's (alleged) failure to exercise due care into the case. 
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 Thus, the district court misapplied this factor.  
 We acknowledge that, notwithstanding the foregoing 
discussion, it is unclear whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would endorse even an objective application of the fifth Wade 
factor in performing the Azzarello threshold analysis.  The court 
has held that the existence of due care in strict liability cases 
is irrelevant, both with respect to the supplier and the 
consumer. Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899.  Although it 
may appear that in doing so, that court has implicitly rejected 
the fifth Wade factor, its concern is with divorcing negligence 
concepts from strict liability proceedings;14 we do not believe 
that the inquiry suggested by the fifth Wade factor injects 
negligence into the action or diverts the focus away from the 
condition of the product, but rather it informs the decision as 
to whether the product, as designed, is not reasonably safe when 
used as intended. 
 As Dean Wade explained in his seminal article enunciating 
the factors, the focus of the inquiry is on the product: 
 
Suppose that a consumer buys and wears shoes that are too 
little or tires that are too large for his automobile, 
or that he uses the product without following 
instructions.  If he is injured as a result and brings 
                     
     
14See Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (holding 
trial court erred in instructing on manufacturer's 
foreseeability, as "[t]o require foreseeability is to require the 
manufacturer to use due care in preparing his product.  In strict 
liability, the manufacturer is liable even if he has exercised 
all due care."); see also Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
364 Pa. Super. 26, 33, 527 A.2d 134, 138 (1987) (where trial 
court had instructed jury that plaintiff's "misuse", "abuse", or 
"abnormal use" of the product was a defense to a strict liability 
claim, the court cautioned that, on remand, the introduction of 
the element of due care was not an issue).   
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suit, the problem may be posed in terms of whether he 
was at fault and whether his fault should bar recovery 
in an action based on strict liability.  The initial, 
and really significant, problem is whether the product 
was duly safe or not.  A good pair of shoes size 5 is 
not unduly unsafe because it may be worn by a woman 
with feet size 7 . . . . A product with adequate 
instruction for its safe use may as a result be duly 
safe, and it is not rendered unsafe by the fact that 
the consumer did not follow the instructions. . . . 
 
 Further illustrations easily present themselves.  There 
is no drug, and perhaps no food, that is not dangerous 
if too much of it is consumed.  It is missing the real 
point to pose the issue in terms of whether the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in taking too 
many pills or too much food.   
Wade, supra, at 846 (footnotes omitted).  The analysis does not 
center on the due care vel non of the consumer but rather 
highlights whether a product is duly safe for its intended use. 
 This is true of all of the Wade factors.  For example, the 
focus of the sixth factor, which considers "the user's 
anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and 
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the 
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable 
warnings or instruction," is on the product: 
 
  [T]he dangers of a hoe or an axe  
 are both matters of common knowledge and  
 fully apparent to the user.  But it is not  
 necessarily sufficient to render a product  
 duly safe that its dangers are obvious,  
 especially if the dangerous condition  
 could have been eliminated.  A rotary lawn  
 mower, for example, which had no housing  
 to protect a user from the whirling blade  
 would not be treated as duly safe, despite  
 the obvious character of the danger.  
 
 Note that the question here is whether the  
 product possesses the quality of due safety,  
 not whether the plaintiff assumed the risk  
 or was contributorily negligent.  
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Id. at 842-43.  
 Thus, insofar as the fifth Wade factor inquires into the 
(objective) conduct of the average product user as a factor that 
may justify a more or less exacting design depending on the 
facts, it seems to be an appropriate ingredient in the Wade risk-
utility balance, which itself seems a useful approach to 
performing the Azzarello threshold analysis.  We thus predict 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow that approach.  
But only that Court can tell us, see Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 302-
304 (Becker, J., dissenting), and we hope that it will do so 
soon.  
 Properly applying the fifth Wade factor to determine the 
objective user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care 
in the use of the profiler, we find that the factor weighs 
slightly in Surace's favor.  Although an individual working on 
the ground behind the profiler could, in theory, avoid danger by 
exercising care to always remain out of the machine's blind spot, 
it seems likely that ordinary workers at a highway construction 
site will occasionally find it necessary to step behind the 
machine, and that such workers may, like Surace, be habituated to 
the profiler's alarm and thus unable to avoid danger if the 
profiler's operator backs up without signaling. 
  3.  Other Wade Factors 
 We do not discuss the other Wade factors except in passing 
because they are either neutral or favor Surace in the risk-
utility balance.  The profiler is, of course, useful and 
desirable.  (Wade factor one)  There does not appear to be a 
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substitute product that would meet the same need and not be 
unsafe. (factor three)  Finally, it seems feasible for the 
manufacturers to spread any loss implicated by a safer design in 
a variety of ways. (factor seven) 
  4.  Summary  
 We have rejected both the factual and legal bases of the 
district court's holding that the profiler was not defective as a 
matter of law, and conclude that the threshold Azzarello test has 
been met.  Specifically, when we evaluate the risk-utility 
factors in the light most favorable to Surace, we conclude that 
the profiler may pose a grave risk of harm absent a 
lockout/tagout device, in view of the phenomenon of habituation. 
 The summary judgment must therefore be set aside and the case 
must go to the jury, though, of course, the jury may find for the 
defendant if it determines that the facts do not support a 
finding of defect.  See supra at 13.  
 There is, however, one other problem in the case -- that 
presented by the district court's conflation of the causation 
issue into the Azzarello analysis.   
 III.  CAUSATION; SEPARABILITY FROM AZZARELLO ANALYSIS 
 In a footnote in its opinion, the district court indicated 
that, although contributory negligence is irrelevant in a strict 
liability case, consideration of Surace's conduct in wearing the 
earplugs and turning his back to the machine was appropriate as 
part of the Azzarello threshold analysis to the extent that it 
bears on causation. Surace, 1995 WL 495123 at *8 n.10.  We hold 
that it was error for the district court to have weighed the 
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issue of causation as a factor in resolving the legal question of 
risk allocation.   
 There are two elements to a strict liability claim.  The 
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the product was defective; and 
(2) the defect was a proximate cause of the injury. See 
Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 898.  It is only the first element that a 
court must address as part of the Azzarello threshold analysis. 
See Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 556-58, 391 A.2d at 1025-26; see also 
Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 512-13 n.3 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(focusing on whether the product was defective under Azzarello 
and specifically declining to address proximate cause); Phillips 
v. A-Best Prods. Co., 542 Pa. 124, 131, 133 n.7, 665 A.2d 1167, 
1171, 1171 n.7 (1995) (noting that its decision rested not on 
whether the product was defective under Azzarello, but rather on 
the lack of causation).  This threshold analysis focuses on the 
condition of the product at the time it is marketed, and whether 
that condition justifies placing the risk of loss on the 
manufacturer.  Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.   
 If the plaintiff ultimately proves that the product is 
defective, then the distinct question of whether the defect 
proximately caused the injury must be resolved. Pacheco v. Coats 
Co., 26 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1994); see generally Wade, supra, 
at 842-43.  Should the court determine that the defect was not a 
legal cause of the injury, then the defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.   Although the district court 
followed the correct methodology in balancing the profiler's 
inherent risks against its utility, it erred in factoring the 
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specific circumstances surrounding the cause of the injury into 
this threshold inquiry. 
 IV.  ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 CMI moved for summary judgment on several alternative 
grounds that the district court did not reach.  In view of the 
foregoing discussion, we must reach them. See United States v. 
Taylor, 98 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397 n.16, 99 S. Ct. 675, 686 n.16, 58 
L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (appellee may assert any ground in support of 
the judgment below, whether or not that ground was relied upon or 
even considered by the district court)), cert. denied, -- U.S. 
00, 117 S. Ct. 1016, -- L.Ed.2d -- (1997).  Only two of these 
grounds merit discussion.15  
  A. Intended Use 
 The district court observed in a footnote in its opinion 
that the evidence suggested the profiler was not being used as 
intended at the time of the accident.  Under Azzarello, the 
inquiry is whether the product was safe for its intended use. 
Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027; Marshall, 426 Pa. 
Super. at 162, 626 A.2d at 624.  Although it did not rely on this 
basis in granting summary judgment, the district court opined 
that "[i]t is doubtful that Plaintiffs would be able to convince 
[the district court], or a jury, that using the profiler without 
                     
     
15
  CMI also sought summary judgment on the grounds that the 
profiler had been "substantially changed" and that Surace's 
conduct was the sole cause of the accident, but these claims are 
patently lacking in merit.                                       
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the conveyor system was a way in which the profiler was intended 
to be used." Surace, 1995 WL 495123, at *9 n.11.  
 On appeal, CMI continues to assert that liability should not 
be imposed because the profiler was not used as intended.  CMI 
submits that the profiler was not meant to mill rumble strips, 
and that it was not meant to be operated without the conveyor 
attached.  Because the profiler was being operated without the 
conveyor attached, the debris generated by it had to be picked up 
manually.  At the time of the accident, Surace was sweeping or 
shoveling debris out of its pathway.  Surace testified that this 
was both the first time he had ever worked with the profiler 
without the conveyor attached, or that anyone had been injured 
when the machine was in back-up mode.  
 It is clear that "[u]nless the use giving rise to a strict 
liability cause of action is a reasonably obvious misuse  
. . . or unless the particular use . . . is clearly warned 
against, the manufacturer is not obviously exonerated." Metzgar 
v. Playskool, Inc., 30 F.3d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1994).  CMI's 
Engineering Manager John Frost Phillips testified that the 
machine was not intended to be operated without the conveyor 
attached, and that it was not intended to mill rumble strips. 
Although Phillips testimony is probative, there was no warning in 
the manual indicating that the conveyor should not be removed.  
Moreover, the profiler had an on/off switch to control the 
conveyor and, obviously, the profiler could be operated without 
the conveyor attached and used to mill rumble strips.  We hold 
that, on the record before us, it cannot be determined as a 
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matter of law that such use of the profiler was a "reasonably 
obvious misuse."  Accordingly, this cannot serve as an 
appropriate basis for summary judgment. 
  B.  Assumption of Risk 
 CMI argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because 
Surace assumed the risk of his injuries.  Assumption of the risk 
is a viable defense to strict liability actions. McCown v. 
International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 15, 342 A.2d 381, 382 
(1975).  To prevail on an assumption of the risk defense, a 
defendant must show "that the plaintiff knew of the defect and 
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to use the product or 
encounter a known danger." Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
890 F.2d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1989)(citation omitted). "[W]hether 
the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he 
understands and appreciates its magnitude . . . is a question of 
fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper 
instructions from the court.  The court may itself determine the 
issue only where reasonable men could not differ as to the 
conclusion." Mucowski v. Clark, 404 Pa. Super. 197, 202, 590 A.2d 
348, 350 (1991) (quoting Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., 364 Pa. 
Super 37, 49, 527 A.2d 140, 146 (1987)).   
 CMI asserts that Surace was aware of the danger of being in 
the path of the profiler while it was operating.  To infer 
assumption of the risk from Surace's conduct, the conduct “must 
be such as fairly to indicate that [Surace was] willing to take 
his chances." Wagner, 890 F.2d at 657 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 496C, comment h).  It is undisputed that 
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Surace was responsible for signaling the operator when to reverse 
and that Snyder reversed the profiler without waiting for a 
signal from Surace.  The evidence further indicates that Snyder 
had never before reversed the profiler without being signaled. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that Surace knew that, due to 
habituation, he was unlikely to hear the profiler's backup alarm 
if Snyder should advance without signaling.  Therefore, the 
evidence is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that 
Surace knowingly assumed the risk of injury when he stepped into 
the profiler's pathway.  Accordingly, summary judgment is not 
warranted on this ground. 
 V.  BRINK'S EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 Surace challenges the district court's exclusion of Harold 
R. Brink as an expert witness.  Surace had proffered Brink, an 
electromechanical engineer, to testify to the inadequacy of the 
profiler's warning devices from an engineering standpoint.  
Brink's "expert opinion" was that the profiler was defective 
because of the obstructed view, and that the back-up alarm was 
insufficient to alert crew workers because of the phenomenon of 
habituation.  The district court excluded Brink's testimony, 
concluding that he did not meet the Supreme Court's test for the 
admission of expert witnesses set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 
(1993), and interpreted by us in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli").  "A district 
court's ruling on admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, `but to the extent the district court's ruling 
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turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence [its] 
review is plenary.’" Paoli, 35 F.3d at 749. 
 The district court excluded Brink's testimony under 
Fed. R. Evid. 702, which provides: 
 
  If scientific, technical, or other  
 specialized knowledge will assist the trier  
 of fact to understand the evidence or to  
 determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified  
 as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,  
 training, or education, may testify thereto in  
 the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
The first requirement under Rule 702 is that the witness 
“proffered to testify to specialized knowledge must be an 
expert.”  Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741.  Although the Rule mandates a 
policy of liberal admissibility, both with respect to the 
substantive as well as the formal qualification of experts, id., 
we agree with the district court that Brink did not qualify. 
 Brink earned a degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh 
University and has had an extensive career in electrical and 
mechanical engineering, including twenty years of employment with 
Mack Trucks.  However, as the district court noted, Brink's 
theory of liability "hinged on habituation," an area in which 
Brink has no training and no experience.  Surace contends that 
through his work experience, Brink "has become highly familiar 
with the concept of habituation and the need to avoid this 
phenomenon when designing construction machinery."   But the 
record does not support this contention.  Regarding habituation, 
Brink only averred generally that "over the years, I've learned 
that people can tune things out."  Significantly, his testimony 
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focuses on making the machines "user friendly" as opposed to 
considering the safety implications of a device.16  
 Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Brink had 
experience in designing equipment from a human safety standpoint. 
 Indeed, in his deposition testimony, Brink testified that he did 
not design back-up alarms; rather they were purchased by Mack and 
he would make sure they were mounted and wired properly.  Brink 
further stated that he did not remember ever having tested back-
up alarms, and that his knowledge of back-up alarm systems is 
limited to the extent to which they could be considered part of 
the design of an electrical/mechanical system.   
 Although he was a member in the Human Factors Society, Brink 
admitted that he had not read any literature on the phenomenon of 
habituation stemming from the alarms on construction machinery, 
nor had he ever participated in a habituation testing or study. 
Most significantly, Brink admitted that he relied on Dr. Lambert 
as the sole authoritative basis for his conclusions regarding 
habituation.  Indeed, when questioned about the specifics of 
habituation, Brink replied "I'll let [Lambert] be the expert on 
                     
     16
  For example, Brink described his human factors experience 
as follows: 
Everything was aimed at making it as easy as possible 
for the person to operate the vehicle as far 
as locations of instruments and controls, 
location of steps for entrance and egress . . 
. we tried to design our product that was as 
manufacturable and maintainable as possible. 
 So to that extent, we always had human 
factors in our mind      . . . .  We never 
called it human factors, but we were 
interested in how the product related to the 
customer or user. 
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this."  While we have recognized that there is no set litmus test 
to qualify as an expert, see Hammond v. International Harvester 
Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) (permitting person with 
sales experience in automotive and agricultural equipment, who 
had also taught high school automobile repair, to testify as an 
expert witness in products liability action involving tractors), 
there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Brink 
possesses sufficient knowledge of the phenomenon of habituation, 
either through training or experience, to testify as an expert.  
Because habituation was the crux of his theory of liability, and 
indeed the central issue of design defect in the case, the 
district court properly concluded that Brink did not qualify as 
an expert.  
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  However, the judgment 
will be affirmed insofar as it precluded the Brink expert 
testimony.  
